From Global Financial Crisis to Sovereign Debt Crisis to a Banking and Fiscal Union or to a New Crisis?

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Before stepping down as President of the European Central Bank in October 2011 Jean-Claude Trichet stated that “the dialectic between the individual nation states and the community of nations” was “at the core of the European project” and that it presented “some of Europe’s most fundamental challenges.”¹ As the European Union (“EU”) navigated through the global financial crisis and the European sovereign debt crisis,² a number of fundamental challenges were made very visible. During the financial crisis the EU institutions addressed issues of reforming financial regulation at the EU level,³ while governments of the EU’s Member States faced political pressures to respond to failures of financial firms as domestic events.⁴

¹ Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the European Central Bank, Tomorrow and the Day after Tomorrow – A Vision for Europe, Speech at the Humboldt University, Berlin (Oct. 24, 2011) at http://www.bis.org/review/r111025e.pdf.

² See, e.g., Nicholas Dorn, Regulatory Sloth and Activism in the Effervescence of Financial Crisis, 33 L. & POLICY 428, 428 (2011) (“In 2010 it became clear that sovereign states, which had “bailed out” the banking sector, were themselves becoming targets of a mixture of speculation and genuine fears and uncertainties over their financial health”).


⁴ See, e.g., Financial Services Authority, THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY
those same governments participated in the G20 meetings and committed to taking collective transnational action in response to the crisis. The sovereign debt crisis called for collective action at the same time as it illuminated the divergent interests of different euro area states and the distinction between the members of the Eurozone and the broader EU membership. While

RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL BANKING CRISIS, 36 (Mar. 2009) at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf ("The crisis revealed fault lines in the global regulation and supervision of some of these crossborder firms, which raise fundamental issues about the appropriate future approach. The essence of the problem – as the Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King has put it – is that global banking institutions are global in life, but national in death.") Cf. EU-US Coalition on Financial Regulation, Inter-jurisdictional Regulatory Recognition: Facilitating Recovery and Streamlining Regulation (Jun. 2012) at 8 ("the absence of any effective global framework for addressing a global financial crisis meant that the immediate legislative and regulatory responses to the crisis were resolutely national or, at best, regional.")

5 The G20 comprises Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Republic of Korea, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America and the EU. France, Germany, Italy and the UK are all members of the EU. For an example of the G20's reaction to the financial crisis see, e.g., G20, Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System (Apr. 2, 2009) at http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2009/2009ifi.html. Cf. Eric J. Pan, Challenge of International Cooperation and Institutional Design in Financial Supervision: Beyond Transgovernmental Networks, 11 Chi. J. Int'l L. 243, 245 (2010) ("For financial law scholars, the G20, both in its existence and in the types of actions it puts forward, represents only a temporary solution to an on-going problem of regulation of international financial markets and institutions.")

6See, e.g., REVIEW OF THE BALANCE OF COMPETENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, 5, Cm 8415 (Jul. 2012) http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/publications/eu-balance-of-competences-review.pdf ("The crisis in the Eurozone has intensified the debate in every country on the future of Europe and there is no exception here. Now is the right time to take a critical and constructive look at exactly which competences lie with the EU, which lie with the UK, and whether it works in our national interest.")
many commentators speculated about whether Greece would exit the euro, and whether the euro and even the EU would collapse, the EU institutions worked to hold the euro area and the EU together. But tensions remain, for example the UK Government insists that the problems in the Eurozone are matters for the Eurozone to solve, rather than for the broader EU. As the


8 For a view that the European sovereign debt crisis should not be seen as a threat to the Euro, see Pascal Salin, There is No “Euro Crisis”, Wall Street Journal Opinion Europe (Jul. 18, 2012) at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303754904577530381082945926.html.


10 See, e.g., European Commission Communication, COM (2011) 777 final (Nov. 15, 2011) (Commission Work Programme 2012: Delivering European Renewal) at 2 (“The European Union is confronted with the challenge of a generation. An economic challenge, that affects families, businesses and communities across Europe. But also a political challenge, to show that the European Union is equal to the task. The European Union can and should make a real difference to how Europeans face up to today's crisis.”)

11 Cf. Nicole Scicluna, When Failure isn’t Failure: European Union Constitutionalism after the Lisbon Treaty, 50 J. COMMON. MKT. STUD. 441, 452 (2012) (“the very projects that were meant to unite European citizens and promote their common identity, such as the euro, are now straining transnational solidarity and producing a rise in nationalist and protectionist sentiments.”)

12 See, e.g., REVIEW OF THE BALANCE OF COMPETENCES BETWEEN THE UNITED KINGDOM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 6, at 10 (“Looking ahead, the Government will: continue to encourage and support the steps needed to ensure stability and strengthened governance in the
EU moves towards further integration to stabilize the Eurozone, it is not clear how the arrangements for financial supervision within the Eurozone and the EU will develop.\footnote{See, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council, Report: Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union (Jun. 26, 2012) http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131201.pdf} at 3 (Stating that “The vision for the future of EMU governance laid out in this report focuses on the euro area Member States as they are qualitatively distinct by virtue of sharing a currency. Nevertheless, the process towards deeper economic and monetary union should be characterised by openness and transparency and be in full compatibility with the single market in all aspects.”) Rather than endorsing the document as it stands, the European Council invited “the President of the European Council was invited to develop, in close collaboration with the President of the Commission, the President of the Eurogroup and the President of the ECB, a specific and time-bound road map for the achievement of a genuine Economic and Monetary Union, which will include concrete proposals on preserving the unity and integrity of the Single Market in financial services and which will take account of the Euro Area statement and, inter alia, of the intention of the Commission to bring forward proposals under Article 127.” \textit{European Council Conclusions (Jun. 29, 2012) available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/131388.pdf} at 3.}

The European sovereign debt crisis demonstrates the mutual dependence of states and financial institutions. European states relied on banks as investors in their debt, and when banks faced difficulties they looked to states to bail them out.\footnote{\textit{Cf. Eurogroup Statement on the follow-up of the 29 June Euro Summit (Jul. 9, 2012) at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/131648.pdf} (referring to “the vicious circle between banks and sovereigns”.)} The EU’s implementation of international harmonized standards of capital adequacy for banks played a role in the development of this mutual dependence because EU rules allowed banks to continue investing in sovereign debt without calculating the real risks associated with their investment.\footnote{\textit{See, \textit{e.g.}, \textit{Hervé Hannoun, Deputy General Manager Bank for International}}}

\begin{enumerate}
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Basel Accord on capital adequacy encouraged banks to hold sovereign debt, and Basel II’s changes to capital adequacy requirements to fine-tune risk weightings relied on sovereign ratings, which underestimated the risks of sovereign default of European states.16 Under the Basel II standardized approach, banks’ holdings of AAA and AA-rated sovereign debt could be zero risk weighted for capital adequacy purposes,17 thus banks were not required to hold any regulatory capital with respect to such investments. For the future the EU will reflect sovereign risk in its capital adequacy rules.18

The European tensions revealed and exacerbated by the crises are inherent in the EU system. The entity which is now the EU has developed incrementally over time, and involves a continuous process of negotiation and renegotiation. The European sovereign debt crisis has encouraged the Commission to push for more harmonization of financial regulation, for example, proposing the use of legislative instruments which limit the ability of the Member States to apply divergent rules.19 The structure and roles of the EU’s financial authorities have changed. The EU

Settlements, Sovereign Risk in Bank Regulation and Supervision: Where Do We Stand?, Speech at the Financial Stability Institute High-Level Meeting, Abu Dhabi, UAE (Oct. 26, 2011) at http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp111026.pdf. Hannoun notes that “it is fair to say that we do not know precisely how other jurisdictions treat sovereign risk. The EU directives have the merit of being transparent and it may well be that elsewhere in the world a zero risk weight is also widely applied to sovereign exposures in a more opaque, purely domestic, regulatory process.” Id.

16 Id.

17 See, e.g., id. (“the Basel II standardised approach allows a zero risk weight to be applied to AAA and AA-rated sovereigns.”)

18 See, e.g., id. (“To prevent underestimation of risk for sovereign debt held in the banking book, the EBA set a floor on the sovereign risk parameters....This...paves the way for a sound implementation of Basel standards in the European Union, moving away from the zero risk weight for sovereigns.”)

19 See, e.g., European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council On Prudential Requirements for Credit Institutions and Investment Firms, COM(2011) 452 final (Jul. 20, 2011) at 8 (“Shaping prudential requirements in the form of a Regulation would ensure that those requirements will be directly applicable to institutions. This
now has a set of agencies which have regulatory powers with respect to different aspects of financial regulation.\textsuperscript{20}

At the beginning of the global financial crisis the EU had a central bank, the ECB, with responsibilities for monetary policy within the euro area, and with a mandate to ensure price stability,\textsuperscript{21} but with limited powers to co-ordinate economic and fiscal policies within the EU, and no powers to regulate banks. The system separated responsibilities for managing monetary policy within the Eurozone and responsibilities for financial regulation. The ECB has been an important actor in the EU’s response to the dual crises. In terms of the immediate response to the crisis the ECB plays a significant role in the EU’s new European Systemic Risk Board, and provides liquidity to banks through the Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) program.\textsuperscript{22}

\begin{itemize}
\item[20] See Regulation No 1093/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Banking Authority), O.J. L 331/12 (Dec. 15, 2010); Regulation No 1095/2010 Establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), O.J. L 331/84 (Dec. 15, 2010); Regulation No 1094/2010 establishing a European Supervisory Authority (European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority) O.J. L 331/48 (Dec. 15, 2010).
\item[21] See, e.g., Hanspeter K. Scheller, \textbf{THE EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, HISTORY, ROLE AND FUNCTIONS}, 12 (2\textsuperscript{nd} Ed. 2006) \textit{available at} http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/ecbhistoryrolefunctions2006en.pdf (“The ECB is also the embodiment of modern central banking: the overriding objective of its monetary policy is price stability”.)
\end{itemize}
For the future the ECB is to become a banking regulator. As a lender of last resort, the ECB needs to have powers to regulate the institutions that may look to it for support. For the future, banks - at least in the Eurozone - may be European in life and in death. This development raises a number of questions ranging from technical issues about how the new system will work, and whether the EU and Eurozone can agree on the details to more general questions about the relationship between central banking and bank regulation, and between bank regulation and the regulation of other financial firms.

An important feature of the EU has always been that it is as much a political as an economic union. Economic co-ordination was designed as an instrument to prevent conflict as much as it was an end in itself. Monetary integration was identified as part of the European project very early on, and the achievement of a single currency was seen as being important for political purposes, to increase integration in Europe. But the single currency was not bolstered by adequate controls over the fiscal policies of the euro area Member States.

Enforcement of

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23 See, e.g., Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, supra note 13.

24 Scheller identifies 1962 as the starting point for consideration of monetary integration in Europe. Scheller, supra note 21, at 15 (“the most appropriate starting point would therefore seem to be the year 1962 ... and a European Commission document known as the Marjolin Memorandum. This memorandum initiated the first discussion on monetary integration at the Community level and prompted the first, albeit very limited, measures in the field of monetary cooperation.”)


26 See, e.g., Ludger Schuknecht et al., The Stability and Growth Pact: Crisis and Reform, 9, European Central Bank Occasional Paper Series No 129 (Sep. 2011) at http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp129.pdf (noting that although the Member States agreed on a Stability and Growth Pact as a component of the institutional arrangements for the Euro, the “Pact’s Achilles heel was its weak enforcement provisions”); International Monetary Fund, Growth Resuming, Dangers Remain, 3, World Economic Outlook (Apr. 2012) at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2012/01/pdf/text.pdf (“The Stability and Growth Pact was devised to bring about fiscal discipline but failed to forestall bad fiscal policies.”)
compliance with the Stability and Growth Pact criteria was notoriously weak. As a result, Greece was able to manipulate its financial data. For the future the International Monetary Fund has stated that the EU needs to ensure that it has more effective mechanisms to ensure that members of the euro area adopt responsible fiscal policies. But managing the adoption of sound economic governance in a multi-level regulatory environment is a complex matter, and politicians and central bankers need to be conscious of how their statements will be received in a range of different audiences. As EU policy-makers face the issues of maintaining economic and

27 See, e.g., id. at 10 (noting that the 2005 reform “introduced greater discretion, leniency and political control into procedures. The strictness of the 3% limit and the time frame for correcting excessive deficits were relaxed, while procedural deadlines were extended. The greater complexity of the rules made monitoring by markets and the public more difficult.”)


29 See, e.g., April 2012 World Economic Outlook, supra note 26, at 23 (“Over the medium term, many difficult decisions will be required to remedy EMU design flaws that contributed to the crisis. A strong mechanism that delivers responsible fiscal policies is urgently needed.”)

30 See, e.g., Jörg Asmussen, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, Building Trust in a World of Unknown Unknowns: Central Bank Communication Between Markets and Politics in the Crisis, Speech at the European Communication Summit 2012, (Jul. 6, 2012) at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120706.en.html (“In Spring 2010, Angela Merkel addressed the German Bundestag to persuade lawmakers to approve the financial assistance programme for Greece. She had to engage in a profoundly political discourse. She employed all tools of rhetoric. And she justified her appeal by declaring that “the future of the euro is at stake”. This was legitimate. However, in financial markets across the globe, that very same message popped up on traders’ screens as a one-liner: “Merkel questions survival of single currency”. If you were a trader, what would you do? The rest is history. One and the same message is received very differently by different audiences. But those audiences cannot be
financial stability in a context which is political as much as technocratic they face a situation
which is more complex than that faced by technocratic regulators co-ordinating their actions in
networks such as the Financial Stability Board. The EU’s larger context has allowed it to make
more progress in harmonizing financial regulation than has been achieved in the broader
international context, but managing the political aspects of harmonization is not simple.

For many observers the EU’s response to the crises also raises the recurrent issue about
the extent to which decision-making in the EU is and should be a democratic and transparent
process, relying on the Community method rather than a process of negotiation between the
governments of the Member States at Summit Meetings. This issue arises in the EU — in a
way that it does not when the Basel Committee adopts new standards for capital adequacy —
because, unlike the Basel Committee the EU has powers to make rules which are formally
binding on the Member States and on EU citizens much as a domestic legislature does. As a
result of the crisis European citizens in a number of states have experienced austerity measures
which they may blame on the EU as much as on their own governments.

The article describes the evolution of the financial and sovereign debt crises, and how the
EU has responded to the crises. Finally it looks to the future.

The Global Financial Crisis and Sovereign Debt Crisis

In the summer of 2007 the financial markets noticed evidence of problems in the asset-
backed securities markets when funds which had invested in securities backed by US subprime
mortgages froze redemptions. A problem which originated in one area of financial activity

— separated easily. “Political” communication and the processing of this information in nervous
and fragile markets has been a major factor that exacerbated and propagated the crisis.”)

31 See, e.g., Speech by Martin Schulz, supra note 9 (“In the past few months we have
witnessed a disturbing trend towards renationalisation and ‘summitisation’: the Heads of State
and Government are arrogating more and more decisions to themselves, debating and taking
decisions behind closed doors and in disregard of the Community method.”)

March 2008, 3 (Jun. 30, 2008) (“The simmering turmoil in financial markets came to the boil on
9 August 2007. On that day, a number of central banks felt compelled to take extraordinary
spread as market participants lost confidence in their ability to value financial assets. Financial institutions suffered losses and regulators intervened to provide support. For example, the Federal Reserve Board helped Bear Stearns to merge with JP Morgan Chase in early 2008. Central banks provided liquidity support to banks, and states even acquired ownership interests in assets of financial institutions or in the institutions themselves. For example, the UK nationalized Northern Rock, a bank which found that it was unable to fund its mortgage loans in the market.

Public support for financial institutions shifted the costs of financial failures to measures in an attempt to restore order in the interbank market. The disorder was triggered by a freeze on redemptions from a small number of funds that had invested in structured finance products backed by US subprime mortgages of recent vintage.

See, e.g., id. at 4 (“By early August, a combination of growing concerns about the valuations of complex products, liquidity risk and counterparty risk had led to a host of other markets being negatively affected. There was an effective collapse of the market for structured products based on mortgages, a massive withdrawal of investors from the asset-backed commercial paper market, and a sudden drying-up of interbank term money markets in the major currencies.”)

Id. at 5.

See, e.g., id. at 9 (“The Federal Reserve felt the need to be especially flexible. It successfully introduced a new facility to auction discount window credit, to address the stigma associated with the traditional use of the discount window. Moreover, after the assisted takeover of Bear Stearns, the Fed agreed to extend loans to primary dealers as part of its normal operations, although these firms are not commercial banks and, indeed, are not even supervised by the Federal Reserve System.”)

Id. at 10; The Northern Rock plc Transfer Order 2008, S.I. 2008 No. 432.

House of Commons Treasury Committee, The Run on the Rock, Fifth Report of Session 2007–08, Vol. 1, HC 56–1 (Jan. 26, 2008) at 3 (“The directors of Northern Rock were the principal authors of the difficulties that the company has faced since August 2007. The directors pursued a reckless business model which was excessively reliant on wholesale funding.”)
taxpayers. The costs of financial bailouts put pressure on the public finances of many countries, which were already strained by other policy decisions, and by declines in tax revenues during the crisis. States implemented austerity measures, either at their own initiative, or as a condition of borrowing. Greece’s debt burden became unsustainable and it sought financial

See, e.g., European Commission, Proposal for a Council Decision Addressed to Spain on Specific Measures to Reinforce Financial Stability, COM (2012) 406 final (Jul. 16, 2012) at 4 (“As of April 2012, the total gross financial contribution by the Spanish State (excluding bond issuance guarantees) amounted to about EUR 34 billion (3.2% of GDP). The capital support was provided via the Fund for Orderly Bank Restructuring (FROB) endowed with a capital of EUR 15 billion, of which EUR 9 billion were already paid in. The State has also provided guarantees to bank senior bond issues amounting to about EUR 86 billion (out of this total, about EUR 58 billion guarantees are outstanding”); HM Treasury, Annual Report and Accounts 2011-12, HC 46 (Jul. 2012).

See, e.g., Douglas Sutherland, Peter Hoeller & Rossana Merola, Fiscal Consolidation: How Much, How Fast and by What Means?, OECD Economic Policy Papers No. 1 (Apr. 2012) at 11 (noting that for a number of countries the fiscal challenge arises from “future pension and health care spending pressures” as well as from the financial crisis.”)

See, e.g., id. at 8.

See, e.g., HM Treasury, Spending Review 2010, Cm 7942 (Oct. 2010) at 5 (“The Spending Review sets out how the Coalition Government will carry out Britain’s unavoidable deficit reduction plan. This is an urgent priority to secure economic stability at a time of continuing uncertainty in the global economy and put Britain’s public services and welfare system on a sustainable long term footing.”)

assistance from the EU and the IMF. The “Troika” of the Commission, ECB and IMF imposed significant austerity measures on Greece, and an EU Task Force for Greece began operating in Athens to “bolster the country's administrative capacity and provide technical assistance.” In return, Greece obtained financial support from the European Financial Stability Facility. Ireland and Portugal have also received support from the European Financial Stability Facility. In 2012 Spain sought financial support from the EU to help it to sustain its financial institutions. These developments made visible distinctions between what came to be described

1 (“Taking into account the institutional weaknesses of the Greek public finances and economy at large, Greece should design and implement, starting as soon as possible in 2010, a bold and comprehensive structural reforms package”.)

43 Cf. OECD Economic Surveys: Greece 2011, supra note 28, at 11 (“Greece needs to modernise its economy by adopting structural reforms that move its public sector and labour and product markets closer to international best practice. Waste of public resources must end; tax evasion must be decisively attacked; public services need to improve and confidence needs to be restored between the Greek citizens and their government; employment of youth, women and seniors should increase; effort, efficiency and innovation of workers should be encouraged and rewarded.”)


45 See, e.g., European Financial Stability Facility, EFSF Newsletter (Jun. 2012) at http://www.efsf.europa.eu/attachments/201206-efsf-newsletter-n05.pdf (Noting financial support to Greece, and that “The crisis mechanism comes as a complement to the key elements for progress: the structural reforms and fiscal consolidation on the national level and the measures on the European level such as the fiscal compact, increased surveillance and pan-European supervisory bodies.”)

46 EFSF Newsletter, supra note 45.

47 See, e.g., Proposal for a Council Decision Addressed to Spain on Specific Measures to Reinforce Financial Stability, supra note 38, at 2 (“On 9 June, the Eurogroup was informed about Spanish authorities' intention to apply for financial assistance to recapitalize its banking sector. The Eurogroup stated that it was willing to respond favourably to such a request and committed to granting Spain financial assistance, covering estimated capital requirements with
as the peripheral EU Member States which required financial support, and those Member States which would be providing the support.48

As the crises developed, the Member States and the EU itself faced fundamental issues of social policy as well as of management of economic policy and financial regulation. Pension reform became a policy issue for the EU, partly because of demographic change, but also because of the financial problems in the Eurozone.49 The implementation of austerity measures means that citizens tended to feel the cost of bailout in terms of increased taxes and reduced government spending.50 High unemployment levels contributed to poverty.51 But unemployment

an additional safety margin, estimated as summing up to EUR 100 billion in total.”)

48 See, e.g., Mark Hallerberg, Fiscal Federalism Reforms in the European Union and the Greek Crisis, 12 EUR. UNION POL. 127, 128 (2011) (“The sovereign debt crisis in Greece in the spring of 2010 and, to a much lesser extent, in Ireland, Spain and Portugal seemed to change everything. It put significant pressure on the euro and on the governance structures of the euro zone. It also made clear the degree to which all countries in the euro zone are connected to one another. Budget decisions in one of the smallest economies in the euro zone had implications for all countries that have the euro.”)

49 See, e.g., European Commission, White Paper: An Agenda for Adequate, Safe and Sustainable Pensions, COM (2012) 55 final (Feb. 16, 2012) at 2 (“Together, longevity growth and the transition into retirement of the baby-boomers will have far-reaching economic and budgetary consequences in the EU, reducing the economic growth potential and exercising pressure on public finances...the success of retirement reforms in the Member States is a major determining factor for the smooth functioning of the Economic and Monetary Union”.)

50 See, e.g., Jonathan Cribb, Robert Joyce & David Phillip, LIVING STANDARDS, POVERTY AND INEQUALITY IN THE UK: 2012, Institute for Fiscal Studies, IFS Commentary C124 (Jun. 2012) available at http://www.ifs.org.uk/comms/comm124.pdf at 2 (“The fiscal tightening being implemented by the coalition government includes net tax rises and cuts to benefits, which will put further downward pressure on household incomes. Considering all these factors, recent forecasts by IFS researchers have suggested that median household income will continue to fall in real terms until 2013–14, and still be lower in 2015–16 than it was in 2002–03. If realised, this would represent the worst period for changes in median income since at least the early 1960s,
levels vary between the EU’s Member States. In March 2012, Austria had the lowest unemployment rate, at 4% and Spain had the highest, at 23.3%.52

Thus, although the responses to the financial crisis and the sovereign debt crisis have involved discussions about complex financial transactions and firms and their regulation and the technical conditions for financial support to financial institutions and the Member States, the crises have also affected European citizens. The EU’s sovereign debt crisis is a major threat to the stability of the financial markets,53 to the international economy,54 to the EU itself,55 and to the citizens who live there.


51 See, e.g., European Commission, EU Employment and Social Situation: Quarterly Review (Mar. 2012) available at http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=7548&langId=en at 5 (noting that the “youth unemployment rate has reached a historic high in several countries and an unprecedented one of 22.4% in the EU in January 2012 (nearly 50% in Spain and Greece”). Lower income groups suffered more from financial stress since the crisis than higher income groups. Id. at 27.

52 Id. at 16.


54 See, e.g., Christine Lagarde Managing Director, International Monetary Fund, Global Challenges in 2012, Speech in Berlin (Jan. 23, 2012) at http://www.imf.org/external/np/speeches/2012/012312.htm (“..this is a defining moment...It is about saving the world from a downward economic spiral. It is about avoiding a 1930s moment, in which inaction, insularity, and rigid ideology combine to cause a collapse in global demand. The longer we wait, the worse it will get. The only solution is to move forward together. Our collective economic future depends on it.”

55 See, e.g., supra note 9.
The crisis throws into relief and intensifies features of the European Union which are perennial although they have not always been or seemed so critical. Structurally, the EU combines intergovernmental and supranational features: in the Council and the European Council representatives of national governments meet together to agree on policies; whereas other institutions of the EU have more of a supranational character. Citizens elect Members of the European Parliament to represent their interests directly as part of the EU’s legislative process, although disillusioned citizens may be less inclined to participate in EU elections. Members of the Commission and Judges on the Court of Justice and General Court are required under the Treaties to act independently of the states that nominate them. Even the Council has some supranational characteristics because it takes many decisions by majority vote, so that Member States may be bound by decisions they did not agree to. The EU’s legislative process has developed over time so that the European Parliament, a supranational body, shares legislative power with the Council in most matters (this is what is known as the Community Method). However, at difficult times, such as during the financial and sovereign debt crises, the Member States have often chosen to meet in Summit Meetings to make important decisions. The Members of the European Parliament do not participate in these Summit Meetings.

When Martin Schulz became President of the European Parliament in early 2012 he recognized that European citizens were facing high levels of unemployment and increased

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56 See, e.g., James P. Cross, *Interventions and Negotiation in the Council of Ministers of the European Union*, 13 EUR. UNION POL. 47, 47-48 (2012) ("it is in the Council where citizens’ domestic-level government representatives can make national policy positions known and thus influence the legislative process. Therefore, the relative influence that each member state can exert on the legislative process within the Council is of fundamental importance to the democratic legitimacy of the institution as a whole.")


58 Cf. Scicluna, *supra* note 11, at 442 (arguing “that the separation of the symbols and rhetoric of constitutional patriotism from EU treaty reform coincides with, and reinforces, a trend away from political and legal supranationalism.”)
poverty,\textsuperscript{59} and that this led to a “crisis of confidence in politics and its institutions” which was “also undermining faith in the European integration process.”\textsuperscript{60} He noted that

For months now the Union has been stumbling from one crisis summit to another. Decisions which affect us all are being taken by heads of government behind closed doors. To my mind, this is a reversion to a form of European politics which I thought had been consigned to the history books: it is reminiscent of the era of the Congress of Vienna in the 19th century, when Europe's leaders were ruthless in their defence of national interests and democratic scrutiny was simply unheard of.\textsuperscript{61}

Martin Schulz is not alone in suggesting that the crises have undermined the community method, and have led to intergovernmental agreements on the one hand and independent action by Member States on the other. Members of the Commission, on the other hand, tell a different story, emphasizing the importance of the Community method in resolving the crises.\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{59} Inaugural speech by Martin Schulz following his election as President of the European Parliament (Jan. 17, 2012) at \url{http://www.europarl.europa.eu/the-president/en/press/press_release_speeches/speeches/sp-2012/sp-2012-january/speeches-2012-january-1.html} (“As a result of the economic crisis, in many countries poverty is on the increase and unemployment has reached disastrous levels among young people in particular. They are now taking to Europe's streets to protest against an economic system which allows a small minority to rake in the profits when times are good, and forces society as a whole to bear the losses when times are bad; a system whose workings might lead a dispassionate observer to conclude that anonymous ratings agencies in New York are more powerful than democratically elected governments and parliaments.”)

\textsuperscript{60} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{61} \textit{Id.}

\textsuperscript{62} \textit{See, e.g., Maroš Šefčovič, The Strength of the Community Method in Tackling the Crisis and the Role of the Lisbon Treaty, SPEECH/12/105 (Feb. 17, 2012) (“I think it's fair to say that the fundamental lesson of the crisis is that of interdependence: now more than ever, we need greater integration to ensure that national economic and budgetary policies cannot again have such a devastating effect on the euro area and by extension the EU as a whole.”)}
Responses to the Crises

The EU’s system of multi-level governance requires it to deal with questions about how powers to regulate different activities should be allocated between the EU institutions, the Member States and sub-national authorities. But crises impose stresses on governments, on regional organizations like the EU, and on multi-level governance more generally. National governments, the EU institutions and the International Financial Institutions wished to act to maintain confidence in the international financial markets during the financial crisis and again during the EU’s sovereign debt crisis. The EU and its Member States faced calls to co-operate with other jurisdictions and international financial institutions.63 In both crises domestic politics urged the EU’s Member States to focus on domestic aspects of the crisis and domestic solutions while Treaty obligations and the G20 urged them to focus on co-operation with each other. The G20 called for international co-operation with respect to financial stability, and prudential regulation, for new harmonized standards on hedge funds and credit rating agencies and committed to “implement international financial standards (including the 12 key International Standards and Codes)”.64 The G20, although formed in 1999 to address issues of financial stability, is newly prominent as an actor in transnational financial regulation. The EU is part of the G20, and as the G20's work on financial stability (involving the Financial Stability Board and the IMF) evolves, the EU is more evidently a layer within a more complex multi-level system of financial regulation. As the G20 has reacted to the global financial crisis by emphasizing the need for increased harmonization of standards for financial regulation at the international level, the EU institutions have reacted to the crises by increasing EU level regulation of financial firms and the financial markets, and of the economic policies of the Member States.

Although at the beginning of the financial crisis the EU had a harmonized system of

63 See, e.g., Financial Stability Forum, Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience, 2 (April 2008) ("While national authorities may continue to consider short-term policy responses should conditions warrant it, to restore confidence in the soundness of markets and institutions, it is essential that we take steps now to enhance the resilience of the global system.")

64 See, e.g., The Group of Twenty (G20), Declaration on Strengthening the Financial System (Apr. 2, 2009).
financial regulation in which banks and securities and insurance firms licensed in one State in the European Economic Area could carry on business throughout the EU based on their home state authorization,\textsuperscript{65} harmonization of financial regulation was not complete.\textsuperscript{66} Structurally the EU’s system of financial regulation relied on the sharing of competences between the Member States and EU institutions. The Lamfalussy Report recommended that EU securities regulation should comprise a system of framework rules, detailed implementing rules, co-operation between regulators with respect to implementation of the EU rules and enforcement by the Commission.\textsuperscript{67} The EU established a European Securities Committee composed of representatives of the Member States to advise the Commission on the policy issues and draft legislative proposals,\textsuperscript{68}

\textsuperscript{65} See, e.g., Caroline Bradley, \textit{Consumers of Financial Services and Multi-level Regulation in the European Union}, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1212, 1217 (2008) (“Mutual recognition on the basis of minimum harmonized standards was designed to achieve a situation where a financial firm established in one Member State (its home State) would be allowed to supply services in other Member States and even establish offices in other Member States on the basis of its home State authorization to carry on business subject to home State rules.”)

\textsuperscript{66} In 2000 a Committee of Wise Men argued that integration of financial market regulation in the EU should be improved. The Committee of Wise Men, Initial Report of The Committee of Wise Men On The Regulation of European Securities Markets (2000) at 2 (“An efficient European regulatory process for financial services and capital markets is crucial for the whole of the European Union and all its citizens. Crucial for successful economic reform, for boosting European economic growth. Crucial for helping channel the high rate of European savings towards the corporate sector. Crucial for strengthening both the international competitiveness of the European Union in the global economy and for releasing its entrepreneurial potential. Crucial also for job creation and consumer protection. There are major strategic, economic and social benefits to reap from an integrated European capital market.”)


\textsuperscript{68} Commission Decision Establishing the European Securities Committee, O.J. L 191/45 (Jul. 13, 2001) at Art. 2 (“The role of the Committee shall be to advise the Commission on policy issues as well as on draft legislative proposals the Commission might adopt in the field of securities”). This decision was subsequently amended to cover UCITs. Commission Decision
and a Committee of European Securities Regulators composed of national regulators (CESR).  

The EU subsequently established other committees for banking and insurance and occupational pensions. CESR, CEBS and CEIOPS were transformed during the financial crisis into EU level authorities with enhanced powers. CESR became the European Securities and Markets Authority, CEBS became the European Banking Authority, and CEIOPS became the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority. The EU has been centralizing regulatory supervision in some areas through these agencies. For example, the EBA has carried

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69 Commission Decision Establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators, O.J. L 191/43 (Jul. 13, 2001) at Art. 2 (“The role of the Committee shall be to advise the Commission, either at the Commission's request, within a time limit which the Commission may lay down according to the urgency of the matter, or on the Committee's own initiative, in particular for the preparation of draft implementing measures in the field of securities”). This decision was subsequently amended to cover UCITs. Commission Decision Amending Decision 2001/527/EC establishing the Committee of European Securities Regulators O.J. L 3/32 (Jan. 7, 2004).


73 See supra note 20, and http://www.esma.europa.eu/.


75 See supra note 20, and http://eiopa.europa.eu/.
out stress tests “to assess the resilience of the banks involved in the exercise against an adverse but plausible scenario.” 76 ESMA has responsibility for registering and supervising credit rating agencies under the EU’s CRA regulation. 77 But this regulatory centralization has not gone unchallenged: the UK has questioned the validity of the EU’s delegation of authority to ESMA with respect to short selling and credit default swaps. 78

When the crisis hit there were differences in the content of rules of financial regulation in

76 European Banking Authority, Results of the 2011 EU-wide Stress Test, (Jul. 15, 2011) http://stress-test.eba.europa.eu/pdf/2011+EU-wide+stress+test+results+-+press+release+-+FINAL.pdf. The stress tests did not succeed in enhancing confidence in EU banks as much as the EBA had hoped. See European Banking Authority, Annual Report 2011 http://www.eba.europa.eu/cebs/media/Publications/Other%20Publications/Annual%20report/EB A2012_online_final2.pdf at 3 (“A key component of the Risk Analysis activities in 2011 was the EU-wide stress test exercise which was performed on a sample of 91 banks using a single adverse scenario and consistent methodology. This exercise has proven to be a very strong incentive for the banks involved as they took considerable actions to avoid falling below the benchmark of 5% CT1 and raised some EUR 50 bn in fresh capital in the first four months of 2011 in anticipation of meeting the commonly agreed capital threshold. Despite its success also in terms of great disclosure and quality assurance, the main objective of restoring confidence in the European banking sector was not achieved, as the sovereign debt crisis extended to more countries.”)


different Member States: deposit guarantees varied from one state to another.\textsuperscript{79} And the EU had not agreed harmonized rules for rescuing financial institutions in distress,\textsuperscript{80} or to address volatility caused by short selling.\textsuperscript{81} The Commission has proposed a new rules in a number of

\textsuperscript{79} See, \textit{e.g.}, Proposal for a Directive Amending Directive 94/19/EC on Deposit Guarantee Schemes as Regards the Coverage Level and the Payout Delay, COM(2008) 661 (Oct. 15, 2008) at ¶ 5.2 (“The current Directive allows an optional co-insurance of up to 10\%, i.e. a certain percentage of losses that is borne by the depositor. This has proven counterproductive for the confidence of depositors and may have exacerbated the problems. The argument of moral hazard (depositors should be 'punished' if they deposit their funds at a bank offering high interest rates but incurring high risks) is not tenable since retail depositors cannot, in general, judge the financial soundness of their bank. Consequently, this option should be discontinued.”) \textit{Cf.} Sebastian Schich, \textit{Financial Crisis: Deposit Insurance and Related Financial Safety Net Aspects}, 95 \textit{FIN. MKT. TRENDS} (OECD 2008/2).

\textsuperscript{80} See, \textit{e.g.}, European Commission Communication, COM (2009)561 (Oct. 20, 2009) (An EU Framework for Cross-Border Crisis Management in the Financial Sector) at p 2 (“The recent crisis has exposed the EU's lack of an effective crisis management for cross-border financial institutions. In autumn 2008, Member States agreed to take the necessary action to recapitalise and guarantee banks, and this unprecedented action was coordinated at European level on an ad-hoc basis. The measures were necessary in the exceptional conditions that afflicted the financial system.”)

\textsuperscript{81} See, \textit{e.g.}, Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps, O.J. L 86/1 (Mar. 24, 2012) at Recital no. 1 (“At the height of the financial crisis in September 2008, competent authorities in several Member States and supervisory authorities in third countries such as the United States of America and Japan adopted emergency measures to restrict or ban short selling in some or all securities. They acted due to concerns that at a time of considerable financial instability, short selling could aggravate the downward spiral in the prices of shares, notably in financial institutions, in a way which could ultimately threaten their viability and create systemic risks. The measures adopted by Member States were divergent as the Union lacks a specific common regulatory framework for dealing with short selling issues.”) \textit{See also} the Short Selling Regulation, \textit{supra} note 78.
different areas to address perceived weaknesses in EU financial regulation.\textsuperscript{82}

The Commission adapted the EU’s state aid rules (which are meant to prevent the Member States interfering with competition by subsidizing local industries) to allow the Member States to rescue failing, and even fundamentally sound, financial institutions promptly while not undermining the state aid rules.\textsuperscript{83} Although the Commission adopted its guidelines to allow the Member States to act to rescue financial institutions quickly, the need for rescues of financial institutions persisted into 2012.\textsuperscript{84} The Commission worked on developing an EU crisis

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\textsuperscript{82} \textit{See, e.g.}, European Commission Communication, COM(2010) 301 final (Jun. 2, 2010) (Regulating Financial Services for Sustainable Growth) at 2 (noting that “the Commission has been working to complete a comprehensive financial reform to address short-termism, poor risk management and a lack of responsibility of certain actors in the financial sector and to correct the underlying weaknesses in the supervisory and regulatory framework” and that progress had been made but that the Commission would “present the vast majority of the remaining regulatory reform proposals to the Council and European Parliament by the end of the year.”)

\textsuperscript{83} \textit{See, e.g.}, European Commission Communication, 2008 O.J. C 270/2 (Application of State Aid Rules to Measures Taken in Relation to Financial Institutions in the Context of the Current Global Financial Crisis). The Commission acknowledged that it would be necessary to act quickly to protect the financial markets. \textit{Id.} at 9 (“In applying these criteria to measures taken by Member States, the Commission will proceed with the swiftness that is necessary to ensure legal certainty and to restore confidence in financial markets.”) \textit{See also, e.g.}, Michael Reynolds, Sarah Macrory & Michelle Chowdhury, \textit{EU Competition Policy in the Financial Crisis: Extraordinary Measures}, 33 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1670, 1689 (2010) (“The Commission has attempted to find a middle way between states clamoring for the power to rescue their most important financial institutions and legal purists decrying an apparent chasm between the existing state aid rules and the practice of the Commission.”)

\textsuperscript{84} European Commission Communication O.J. C 356/7 (Dec. 6, 2011) (On the Application, from 1 January 2012, of State Aid Rules to Support Measures in Favour of Banks in the Context of the Financial Crisis) at 7 (“The exacerbation of tensions in sovereign debt markets that has taken place in 2011 has put the banking sector in the Union under increasing pressure, particularly in terms of access to term funding markets. The ‘banking package’ agreed by the Heads of State or Government at their meeting of 26 October 2011 aims to restore confidence in
management framework for banks, and published a proposed Directive in June 2012.

The EU’s response to the global financial crisis thus involved an intensification of EU level financial regulation in terms of a shift of some supervisory powers from national to EU authorities and the development of more and more demanding rules of financial regulation. Although intensifying financial regulation was designed in part to promote confidence in EU financial institutions, rescues were necessary, and the EU loosened the competition law constraints which might have impeded the Member States’ ability to rescue their own troubled financial institutions. However, the cost of rescuing troubled financial firms helped to put pressure on strained public finances, and led to the sovereign debt crisis. Of course the sovereign debt crisis also grows out of a system of monetary union which imposed inadequate controls on the states which participated in it because it was conceived of as a political, rather than an economic, project. Some Eurozone states had weak public finances even before the financial crisis. But the sovereign debt crisis and the financial crisis reinforce each other because banks hold the sovereign debt of EU Member States, and have participated in credit

the banking sector...Despite those measures, the Commission considers that the requirements for State aid to be approved pursuant to Article 107(3)(b) will continue to be fulfilled beyond the end of 2011.”)


Cf. supra note 76.

See, e.g., Dorn, supra note 2.

See, e.g., Marsh, supra note 25.

See, e.g., Peter Praet, Member of the Executive Board of the ECB, Monetary Policy at Crisis Times, speech at the International Center for Monetary and Banking Studies, Geneva, (Feb. 20, 2012) at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2012/html/sp120220.en.html.

default swaps with respect to sovereign debt.\textsuperscript{92} EU bank regulation allowed sovereign risk to infect banks because the rules allowed banks to invest in sovereign debt in reliance on sovereign credit ratings without making their own independent assessments of the risks associated with those investments.\textsuperscript{93} And the concerns about the reliability of credit ratings which led to new EU rules on credit rating agencies\textsuperscript{94} were not initially generalized to sovereign ratings. Political imperatives to rescue failing financial institutions allowed the banks to infect sovereign debt, making it harder for sovereigns to borrow. Strategies adopted to resolve the crisis created new risks. For example, Greece’s retroactive introduction of collective action clauses into Greek law governed debt to allow a restructuring to be imposed on dissenting creditors was seen as having implications for the ability of other Euro-area sovereigns to borrow.\textsuperscript{95} ISDA announced that Greece’s exercise of collective action clauses constituted a Restructuring Credit Event for the purposes of credit default swap transactions relating to Greece.\textsuperscript{96}

The EU sovereign debt crisis illustrates that whereas national governments are tempted to act to protect domestic interests in times of crisis the EU’s Member States are interdependent rather than independent.\textsuperscript{97} The states within the Eurozone are clearly connected by a single currency, but EU states outside the Eurozone are also bound by their links with the other EU Member States. The Member States are required under Art. 121 TFEU to “regard their economic policies as a matter of common concern,” and they are required to avoid excessive deficits under

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\textsuperscript{92} See, e.g., Peter Eavis, Greek Crisis Raises New Fears Over Credit-Default Swaps (Feb. 21, 2012) at \url{http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/02/21/greek-crisis-raises-new-fears-over-credit-default-swaps/?src=me&ref=business}.

\textsuperscript{93} See, e.g., Hannoun, \textit{supra} note 15.

\textsuperscript{94} See \textit{supra} note 77.

\textsuperscript{95} See, e.g., Matina Stevis & Katy Burne, Greek Legal Maneuvers Raise Fears of Euro-Zone Debt Fallout (Feb. 23, 2012) at \url{http://blogs.wsj.com/eurocrisis/2012/02/23/greek-legal-maneuvers-raise-fears-of-euro-zone-debt-fallout/}.

\textsuperscript{96} ISDA, ISDA EMEA Determinations Committee: Restructuring Credit Event Has Occurred with Respect to The Hellenic Republic (Mar. 9, 2012).

\textsuperscript{97} See, e.g., Šefčovič, \textit{supra} note 62.
Art. 126 TFEU. States in the Eurozone are subject to greater constraints. In the past these constraints have often seemed more theoretical than real, which has been recognized for some time as an essential weakness of economic and monetary union in the EU.\(^{98}\) The EU has now been forced to reinforce its economic governance,\(^{99}\) although it is not clear that the new controls will be sufficient to resolve the crisis. The reinforcement of economic governance involves measures which are being implemented via the community method, and new Treaties.

In November 2011 the EU agreed on a reinforced Stability and Growth Pact, known as the six-pack because it comprises five regulations and a directive, and these measures entered into force in December.\(^{100}\) The Commission proposed an additional two-pack in November 2011,\(^{101}\) and also published a Green Paper proposing that the members of the Eurozone be

\(^{98}\) See, e.g., Schuknecht, supra note 26.


\(^{101}\) Proposal for a Regulation on Common Provisions for Monitoring and Assessing Draft
empowered to issue Stability Bonds. But joint issuance of bonds by members of the Euro area would require strong fiscal discipline. The EU and the Eurozone are working on developing stronger fiscal discipline through a treaty among the Eurozone members on the European Stability Mechanism, and a Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union to which all EU Member States except the UK and the Czech


See, e.g., Stijn Claessens, Ashoka Mody, and Shahin Vallée, Paths to Eurobonds, IMF Working Paper, WP/12/172 (Jul. 2012) at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2012/wp12172.pdf at 6 (“the possibility of transfers raises questions about moral hazard and the viability of any common debt proposal crucially depends on the ability to reduce and control it. The stronger the safety net and the larger the transfers, the greater is the concern that some countries may free ride. Common debt issuance thus requires powerful mechanisms to enforce fiscal discipline in a time-consistent manner.”)

Treaty Establishing the European Stability Mechanism, at http://www.european-council.europa.eu/media/582311/05-tesm2.en12.pdf. The Treaty is adopted pursuant to Art 48(6) TEU which allows the European Council, acting by unanimity after consulting the European Parliament, the Commission and, in certain cases, the European Central Bank, to adopt a decision amending all or part of the provisions of Part Three of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and European Council Decision Amending Article 136 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union with Regard to a Stability Mechanism for Member States Whose Currency is the Euro. O.J. L 91/1 (Apr. 6, 2011). The Decision comes into force on 1 January 2013 if ratified by the Member States.

Republic are parties.\textsuperscript{106} As a matter of formal legal rules EU Member States face new levels of control of their domestic economic management. But the EU’s history demonstrates that strong rules are not enough: enforcement of the rules is also important.

The EU’s sovereign debt crisis raises particular issues with respect to financial stability within the Eurozone. But financial stability has also developed more generally as a significant issue in financial regulatory policy at the international level, within the EU and in the governments of the EU Member States because of the financial crisis. The Financial Stability Forum (FSF) which was established a decade earlier to address issues of financial stability became the Financial Stability Board (FSB).\textsuperscript{107} At the domestic level governments began to build a concern for financial stability into financial regulation.\textsuperscript{108} The EU established a European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB)\textsuperscript{109} which was to be chaired by the President of the European

\textsuperscript{106} See, e.g., House of Lords European Union Committee, The Euro Area Crisis, 25th Report of Session 2010–2012, HL Paper 260 (Feb. 14, 2012) (“The proposed ‘fiscal compact’ and economic policy coordination measures for the euro area have been highly controversial. In December 2011 the United Kingdom indicated it would stand aside, and at the end of January 2012 the Czech Republic stated that it would not participate for the time being. Eight of the ten non-euro Member States are likely to join the 17 euro area states in signing the new treaty at the next European Council on 1–2 March 2012. The proposed treaty makes clear that the key provisions apply only to euro area states (unless a non-euro state indicates that it will choose to be bound by them).”)


\textsuperscript{108} HM Treasury, A New Approach to Financial Regulation: Building a Stronger System, CM 8012 (Feb. 2011) at p. 4 (“a new Financial Policy Committee (FPC) will be established in the Bank of England, with responsibility for ‘macro-prudential’ regulation, or regulation of stability and resilience of the financial system as a whole.”)

Central Bank (ECB) for the first five years.\footnote{Id. at Art. 5. See also Regulation No 1096/2010 Conferring Specific Tasks upon the European Central Bank Concerning the Functioning of the European Systemic Risk Board, O.J. L. 331/162 (Dec. 15, 2010). Willem Buiter, commenting on the proposal for the ESRB wrote that it was “ludicrously lopsided in favour of central banks in general and of the ECB in particular.” Willem Buiter, The Proposed European Systemic Risk Board is Overweight Central Bankers (Oct. 28, 2009) at \url{http://blogs.ft.com/maverecon/2009/10/the-proposed-european-systemic-risk-board-is-overweight-central-bankers/#axzz1nAN1lhkg}.} The Regulation establishing the ESRB made clear that the ESRB was to co-operate with the IMF and FSB,\footnote{ESRB Regulation, supra note 109, at recital no. 7 ("The ESRB should draw expertise from a high-level scientific committee and take on all the global responsibilities required in order to ensure that the voice of the Union is heard on issues relating to financial stability, in particular by cooperating closely with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), which are expected to provide early warnings of macro-prudential risks at the global level, and the partners of the Group of Twenty (G-20).")} and also had responsibility for issuing warnings and recommendations to the EU, to individual Member States, and to the European Supervisory Authorities and national regulators.\footnote{Id. at recital no. 17 ("The ESRB should issue warnings and, where it deems necessary, recommendations either of a general or a specific nature, which should be addressed in particular to the Union as a whole or to one or more Member States, or to one or more of the ESAs, or to one or more of the national supervisory authorities with a specified timeline for the relevant policy response.")} The ESRB was to function in part as a mechanism for implementing international financial stability standards in the EU. The ESRB has published recommendations on how the Member States should define the objective of macro-prudential policy, on institutional arrangements for the Member States’ measures with respect to financial stability, and on the need for transparency and accountability.\footnote{ESRB, Recommendation on the Macro-prudential Mandate of National Authorities, O.J. C 41/1 (Feb 14, 2012).} The ESRB emphasized that the national authorities responsible for macro-prudential policy should be “as a minimum operationally independent, in particular from political bodies and from the financial industry.”\footnote{Id. at Recommendation E.}
The ESRB has also issued recommendations on foreign currency lending, and on US dollar denominated funding of credit institutions. Within the EU’s legal system recommendations are not binding, so the effectiveness of the ESRB’s work depends on the Member States’ willingness to give effect to the recommendations.

During the crises the ECB has been actively providing European banks with liquidity support under its Long Term Refinancing Operation (LTRO) program. After Mario Draghi took over at the ECB the ECB extended the period for which support is available and relaxed the conditions for collateral eligibility. The aim of the program is to provide funding for banks while they are unable to raise funds through normal market channels with the hope that at some point they will be able to return to the markets for funding. But some commentators worry about whether banks will become too reliant on this source of funding, and that banks which received money in the LTRO program have invested the funds in high interest (and risky) sovereign debt.

The ECB characterized its role as a central bank as including a need to monitor financial system stability before the recent crises, and the ECB is a member of the FSB. The ECB has the right under the TFEU to be consulted with respect to EU measures in its field of competence

115 ESRB, Recommendation on Lending in Foreign Currencies, O.J. C 342/1 (Nov. 22, 2011).
117 Jean-Claude Trichet wrote that “The establishment of the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) on 16 December 2010 marked a major milestone in terms of Europe learning lessons from the crisis.” ECB Annual Report 2010, supra note 91, Foreword at p. 11.
119 Mary Watkins & Patrick Jenkins, ECB Lending Operation to Define Sentiment, Financial Times (Feb. 23, 2012).
120 See, e.g., European Central Bank, EU Banking Sector Stability (Feb. 2003).
and also on draft national measures which relate to its competence. This means that the ECB expresses its opinions on a wide range of domestic and EU-level measures which relate to the financial system. The ECB’s role in these consultations is an advisory one. In practice the other EU institutions and the Member States may not consult the ECB sufficiently far in advance for the consultation to be effective. But the ECB iterates and reiterates its preoccupations in its

121 Art 127(4) TFEU provides: “The European Central Bank shall be consulted: on any proposed Union act in its fields of competence, by national authorities regarding any draft legislative provision in its fields of competence, but within the limits and under the conditions set out by the Council in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 129(4). The European Central Bank may submit opinions to the appropriate Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies or to national authorities on matters in its fields of competence.” Art 282(5) TFEU provides that “Within the areas falling within its responsibilities, the European Central Bank shall be consulted on all proposed Union acts, and all proposals for regulation at national level, and may give an opinion.” See also Council Decision 98/415/EC on the consultation of the European Central Bank by national authorities regarding draft legislative provisions O.J. L. 189/42 (Jul. 3, 1998).

122 See, e.g., Opinion of the European Central Bank on a proposal for a Directive on the access to the activity of credit institutions and the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms and a proposal for a Regulation on prudential requirements for credit institutions and investment firms, (CON/2012/5) (Jan. 25, 2012) at 4 (“in order to deploy the full benefits of the exercise by the ECB of its advisory role, the ECB should be consulted in due time on any draft Union acts, including draft delegated and implementing acts, falling within its fields of competence.”)

123 See, e.g., Opinion of the European Central Bank on State guarantees (CON/2012/13) (Feb 20, 2012) (noting that “The consultation request was submitted on 27 January, and the consulting authority requested the ECB to consider the consultation as a matter of urgency, without however setting a time limit. On 1 February, without further notice, the draft order was adopted and published in the Boletín Oficial del Estado including an annex on the fee structure that had not been included in the draft text submitted to the ECB. In this context, the ECB would like to remind the Spanish authorities that, according to Article 4 of Decision 98/415/EC, the ECB must be consulted at an appropriate stage enabling the authority initiating the draft
opinions on EU and national measures. For example the ECB emphasizes that responses to the crisis should be collective rather than unilateral.124 Opinions of the ECB cite with approval proposed measures that are consistent with views the ECB had expressed on earlier proposals.125

The ECB has a range of powers, from the hard coercive powers it enjoys in the context of co-ordinating financial support to sovereign debtors to softer powers in the context of its participation in transnational work on financial stability to consultation on EU and Member State initiatives. In 2012 the ECB is a much more visible entity than it was before the crises. And in the summer of 2012 Herman van Rompuy proposed that the ECB should become a banking regulator.126 Also in the summer of 2012 the IMF called for the EU to establish banking and fiscal unions.127

124 See, e.g., Opinion of the European Central Bank on Measures for the Stabilisation of the Financial Market (CON/2012/2) (Jan. 24, 2012) at 3 (“In line with its previous opinions, the ECB emphasises that when adopting measures to deal with the financial crisis, Member States should act in a coordinated manner.”)

125 See, e.g., Opinion of the European Central Bank on the Establishment and Financing of a Resolution Fund and on the Amended Calculation of Contributions to the Deposit Guarantee Scheme (CON/2011/103) (Dec. 12, 2011) at p 4 (“In addition, the ECB welcomes that the draft law and the draft royal decrees accommodate several recommendations in previous ECB opinions on resolutions funds.”)

126 Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, supra note 13.

127 International Monetary Fund, Euro Area Policies: 2012 Article IV Consultation, IMF Country Report No.12/181 (Jul. 2012) at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2012/cr12181.pdf at 10 (“Only a convincing and concerted move toward a more complete EMU could arrest the decline in confidence engulfing the region. A credible roadmap toward a full banking union and fiscal integration will make the short-term crisis measures more effective. Structural reforms throughout the euro area will also be necessary to revive growth in the long run, while macroeconomic policies can smooth the
Imagining the EU’s Futures

During the two recent crises the management of financial regulation, financial stability and economic governance has evolved: there are new, more detailed rules, and EU agencies such as the ECB, ESMA and the EBA have new roles and new powers. As of the middle of 2012 it is unclear what EU financial regulation and economic governance will look like in future. There are more questions than answers. Challenges to the ESM Treaty are being heard by courts in some of the Member States. It is not clear whether the EU will be able to overcome the political difficulties which impeded effective economic governance in the past. The negotiation of a system of banking supervision by the ECB which is consistent with the single market in financial services will be complicated. Herman van Rompuy’s proposal stated that:

The current architecture should evolve as soon as possible towards a single European banking supervision system with a European and a national level. The European level would have ultimate responsibility. Such a system would ensure that the supervision of banks in all EU Member States is equally effective in reducing the probability of bank failures and preventing the need for intervention by joint deposit guarantees or resolution funds. To this end, the European level would be given supervisory authority and pre-emptive intervention powers applicable to all banks. Its direct involvement would vary depending on the size and nature of banks. The possibilities foreseen under Article 127(6) TFEU regarding the conferral upon the European Central Bank of powers of supervision needed adjustment in the short run.”

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129 Cf. Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, supra note 13, at 4 (“an integrated financial framework should cover all EU Member States, whilst allowing for specific differentiations between euro and non-euro area Member States on certain parts of the new framework that are preponderantly linked to the functioning of the monetary union and the stability of the euro area rather than to the single market.”)
over banks in the euro area would be fully explored.\footnote{130} In addition it proposed a European deposit insurance scheme and a European resolution scheme.\footnote{131} Although the document refers to banking supervision, Article 127(6) TFEU relates to the prudential supervision of “credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings,”\footnote{132} which implies that it may be possible to address issues with respect to shadow banking.\footnote{133} Including some supervision with respect to shadow banks in the new EU rules would seem appropriate from the perspective of addressing systemic risk, although it would likely make it more difficult to achieve agreement. Measures adopted under Article 127(6) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union require unanimity in the Council, and this would give negotiating power to countries outside the Eurozone, such as the UK. The European Council responded to the proposal with a request for more concrete proposals, to be developed in consultation with Member States and the European Parliament.\footnote{134} In particular, the European Council noted that amendments to the EU Treaties might be necessary.\footnote{135} The original proposal had envisaged “wide consultation and participation” in

\footnote{130} Id. at 4.
\footnote{131} Id. at 4-5.
\footnote{132} Art. 127(6) TFEU provides: “The Council, acting by means of regulations in accordance with a special legislative procedure, may unanimously, and after consulting the European Parliament and the European Central Bank, confer specific tasks upon the European Central Bank concerning policies relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions and other financial institutions with the exception of insurance undertakings.”
\footnote{134} European Council Conclusions, \textit{supra} note 13, at 3.
\footnote{135} Id. (“They will examine what can be done within the current Treaties and which measures would require Treaty change.”)
realizing its vision.\textsuperscript{136} This is clearly a long process, and demonstrates that the EU’s decision-making structures do not always allow for quick responses to situations of crisis.

The EU is moving further towards a system of financial regulation with EU level agencies exercising supervision over an increasing range of financial activity. ESMA supervises credit rating agencies, and the ECB may supervise banks in the Eurozone (and, presumably, their subsidiaries outside the Eurozone).\textsuperscript{137} These developments are interesting not just to observers of the EU but also to observers of financial regulation more generally, and especially to those who are concerned about the ability of regulators embedded in national jurisdictions to regulate financial activity which crosses geographic boundaries so easily. For academic commentators who argue for the establishment of an international regulator of financial activity\textsuperscript{138} the EU’s actions and travails provide a useful case study. But it is a case study with its own particular features which create some ambiguities. In part because financial regulation is part of a larger picture of integration in the EU than it is at the international level the EU has been able to achieve more harmonization, and more binding harmonization, than the international community supports. At the same time the fact that the EU is a political as well as an economic or regulatory organization means that achieving agreement on further integration takes time, and requires some action to achieve buy-in from citizens. The EU’s procedures for informing citizens and encouraging them to participate in decision-making may not go as far as some would like,\textsuperscript{139} but the EU’s procedures for consulting citizens are much more advanced than those of standard-

\textsuperscript{136} Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary Union, \textit{supra} note 13, at 3 (“Overall, closer EMU integration will require a stronger democratic basis and broad support from citizens. For this reason, it is essential that already the process towards realising this vision is based on wide consultation and participation. Integration and legitimacy have to advance in parallel.”)

\textsuperscript{137} \textit{See, e.g.}, Andrew Duff, \textit{What the EU Agreed Last Week, What it Did Not and What Happens Next}, Euobserver (Jul. 3, 2012) at \url{http://euobserver.com/843/116855} (noting that “[t]he Czechs and Poles have initial worries about losing all control over their banks (which are subsidiaries of eurozone banks).”)

\textsuperscript{138} \textit{See, e.g.}, Pan, \textit{supra} note 5.

\textsuperscript{139} For an assessment of the EU’s transparency policies in the context of financial regulation \textit{see, e.g.}, Caroline Bradley, \textit{Transparency and Financial Regulation in the European Union: Crisis and Complexity}, 35 \textsc{Fordham Int’l L.J.} 1171 (2012)
setters such as the Basel Committee.\footnote{Cf. Caroline Bradley, \textit{Consultation and Legitimacy in Transnational Standard-Setting}, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 480 (2011).} Within the EU there are many groups which are prepared to challenge the idea that matters of financial regulation are purely technical matters to be decided on by experts.\footnote{For example, the European Federation of Financial Services Users has a number of members from different EU Member States. See \url{http://eurofinuse.org/member/externalmembers/1}.} Engaging citizens in the details of financial regulation is a more complex matter. But the costs which failures of financial firms have imposed on European citizens have made it clear that financial regulation in the EU is a political, rather than a technical, issue.\footnote{Cf. Financial Services Consumer Panel, \textit{Getting Consumers a Fair Deal from Regulatory Reform: Briefing on the Financial Services Bill} (Jul. 13, 2012) available at \url{http://www.fs-cp.org.uk/publications/pdf/fsb-briefing.pdf} at 1 (“The Financial Services Consumer Panel represents the interests of consumers by advising the Financial Services Authority (FSA) on policy. The Consumer Panel believes that the recent economic crisis and the financial scandals of the last decade have demonstrated beyond all doubt that consumers need to have a strong voice in the regulatory system.”)}